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JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred by §78-2-2(j) 
Utah Code Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
There are three issues presented for review in this case. 
(1) Does the three (3) month period of limitation provided 
by Utah Code Annotated §57-1-32 bar the plaintiff, Associates 
Financial Services' complaint in the court below? 
The standard of appellate review is a correction of error 
standard. The court construes the facts and views all the 
evidence, including reasonable inferences, in a light most 
favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment. 
Because summary judgment is granted as a matter of law rather 
than fact, the court is free to reappraise the trial court's 
legal conclusions. Oberhansly v. Sprouse, 751 P. 2d 1155, 
1156 (Utah App. 1988) 
2. Was Associates Financial Services, as a purchasing 
junior lienholder at the senior lienholder's sale, subject to 
the "fair value" limitations imposed by Utah Code Annotated 
§57-1-32 which limits recovery to the difference between the 
indebtedness due and the fair market value of the property on 
the date of the trustee's sale? 
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The standard of appellate review is a correction of error 
standard. The reviewing court need give no deference to the 
trial court's conclusions of law but reviews them for correct-
ness. Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P. 2d 245 (Utah 1988); RonCase 
Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 P. 2d 1382 
(Utah 1989) 
3. Is Associates Financial Services, as a purchasing 
junior lienholder at the senior lienholder's non-judicial 
foreclosure sale, precluded by the "one-action rule" from 
bringing a subsequent action against the debtors on the promissory 
note? 
The standard of appellate review is a correction of error 
standard. Madsen v. Borthick, supra. 
THE GOVERNING AUTHORITIES 
The statutory provisions on which this appeal is primarily 
based are Utah Code Annotated §57-1-32 and §78-37-1. 
Utah Code Annotated §57-1-32 provides in pertinent part 
that an action may be commenced to recover the balance due 
upon the obligation for which a trust deed was given as security 
within three (3) months after the non-judicial foreclosure 
sale of the property. This statute is set forth verbatim in 
the Addendum. 
Utah Code Annotated §78-37-1 specifies that there can be 
only one action for the recovery of any debt secured solely 
by a mortgage upon real estate. This provision has come to 
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be known as the "one-action rule." The text of the statute 
is reproduced in the Addendum. 
Title 26 United States Code §7425(d), 28 United States 
Code §2410(d), and 26 Code of Federal Regulations §400.5-1 
dictate the procedures to be followed by the Internal Revenue 
Service or the United States in real property foreclosure 
actions where the property is subject to a lien in favor of 
the I.R.S. or the United States. Pertinent provisions of 
those statutory provisions and regulations are reproduced in 
the Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The defendants-appellants Franklin L. Slaugh and Cheryl 
D. Slaugh seek reversal of a summary judgment entered below 
which awarded the appellee, Associates Financial Services, a 
judgment against the defendants on a promissory note originally 
secured by a trust deed on real property. [R. 157-1583 The 
District Court Judge had previously denied a motion for summary 
judgment filed by the Slaughs [R. 91] and the lender, Associates, 
thereafter filed a motion for partial summary judgment. [R. 
100-101] After hearing oral argument, the District Judge 
issued his Memorandum Decision [R. 147-149] ruling that plain-
tiff was entitled to judgment against the defendants in the 
sum of $26,089.71, plus interest and minus any legal offsets. 
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The District Court subsequently entered Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law [R. 152-156] and an Order and Judgment 
[R. 157-158] from which the defendants appeal. 
The facts relevant to the issues presented for review are 
as follows: 
(a) On or about November 26, 1982 the defendants Franklin 
L. Slaugh and Cheryl D. Slaugh entered into a loan agreement 
with the plaintiff, Associates Financial Services, wherein 
the Slaughs executed a promissory note in favor of the plaintiff 
in the sum of $33,104.14. [R.152-153 Us 1-2] 
(b) The promissory note was secured by a trust deed on 
real property owned by the defendants and located in Salt 
Lake County, Utah. This trust deed was second in priority of 
recording as a lien on that real property. [R. 153 1F4] 
(c) Prior to February, 1989, the Slaughs defaulted on a 
note secured by the senior trust deed on said real property. 
The senior lienholder commenced a non-judicial foreclosure 
proceeding and conducted a trustee's sale as the the real 
property on February 28, 1989. [R. 153 117] 
(d) The Slaughs were not in default on the promissory 
note owing to Associates Financial Services at the time of 
the trustee's sale. [R. 153 1F6] 
(e) Associates Financial Services had an appraisal con-
ducted with respect to Slaughs' real property in February, 
1989 which valued the property at $48,500.00. [R. 34-35] The 
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amount owing to the first trust deed lender on the date of 
sale was $20,300.00. The amount owing to Associates was 
approximately $32,000.00. [R. 153 U8; 154 1114] 
(f) The plaintiff, Associates Financial Services, appeared 
at the trustee's sale conducted by the senior lienholder on 
February 28, 1989 and submitted a bid in the sum of $26,000.00, 
the high bid at the sale. [R. 153 1f8] 
(g) At the time of the trustee's sale, there were unreleased 
federal tax liens of record against the property of which 
Associates had actual and constructive notice. [R. 154 Us 
11-12] 
(h) The Internal Revenue Service subsequently elected to 
exercise its rights of redemption under the provisions of 26 
U.S.C. §7425 and 28 U.S.C. §2410, and did in fact redeem said 
property on June 8, 1989 by paying the sum of $26,000.00 to 
the legal record title holder of the property, Associates 
Financial Services. [R. 36] 
(i) The plaintiff, Associates Financial Services, commenced 
an action in the court below against the Slaughs on October 
12, 1989, seeking to recover a deficiency balance allegedly 
owing it by the defendants in the sum of $26,089.71, plus 
interest. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The lower court's summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff-
lender was based upon erroneous conclusions of law. 
Utah Code Annotated §57-1-32 restricted Associates, as a 
purchasing junior lienholder at the senior foreclosure sale, 
from bringing an action for a deficiency more than three 
months after the sale. The plaintiff did not file its action 
against the Slaughs until over seven (7) months following the 
trustee's sale. Its action is therefore barred by statute. 
Utah Code Annotated §57-1-32 limits the recovery, in an 
action for a deficiency under the Utah Trust Deed Act, to the 
excess of the obligation owing over the fair market value of 
the property comprising the security. This limit on recovery 
is the quid pro quo extended to the lender in exchange for 
the less expensive, quicker remedy of non-judicial foreclosure 
and the corresponding benefit of receiving title to the real 
property which cannot be redeemed by the debtor following the 
sale. 
The Utah "one-action rule" embodied in Utah Code Annotated 
§78-37-1 precludes the plaintiff, Associates, from bringing 
an action against the Slaughs after the senior foreclosure 
sale. Associates, as a purchasing junior lienholder, effectively 
stepped into the shoes of the senior lienholder and its loss 
of the security by virtue of its own negligent conduct 
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effectively bars Associates from instituting the complaint 
filed by it on October 12, 1989 in the court below. 
ARGUMENT 
A. ASSOCIATES FINANCIAL SERVICES, AS A PURCHASING JUNIOR 
LIENHOLDER AT THE SENIOR FORECLOSURE SALE, WAS BARRED 
BY STATUTE FROM COMMENCING ITS ACTION AGAINST APPELLANTS 
MORE THAN THREE MONTHS AFTER THE SALE. 
The question of whether a junior lienholder should be 
governed by the three month limitation imposed by Utah Code 
Annotated §57-1-32 [See Addendum, p. A-1 , for text of statute.] 
has been recently considered by this Court in the case of 
City Consumer Services, Inc. v. Peters, 815 P. 2d 234 (Utah 
1991) and by the Utah Court of Appeals in the case of G. 
Adams Limited Partnership v. Durbano, 782 P. 2d 962 (Utah 
App. 1989). Both of these cases involved "sold-out juniors", 
i.e., junior lienholders who did not purchase the real property 
at the senior lienholder's foreclosure sale. 
In City Consumer Services, Inc. v. Peters, supra, the 
Court reasoned that because City Consumer Services, Inc. was 
a "sold-out junior", that it became an unsecured, general 
creditor and was not therefore pursuing a "deficiency judgment" 
governed by §57-1-32. This result is harmonious with the 
language and operation of §57-1-32 and with standard foreclosure 
practice. As the Utah Court of Appeals pointed out in G. 
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Adams Limited Partnership v. Durbano, supra: 
11
. . .[T]he interpretation urged by appellants 
[that the statute should bar an action by a 
sold-out junior after three months] would work 
anomalous results in several situations. For 
example, if a senior trust deed was foreclosed 
nonjudicially, the beneficiary of a junior 
trust deed would have only three months to 
bring an action on the note formerly secured 
by his or her trust deed. But what if that 
note was not in default? In appellants view, 
the beneficiary would still have only three 
months to bring an action even though no action 
could be brought if no default existed. If the 
debtor could stay current for those three months, 
he or she could then cease making any payments 
whatsoever with absolute impunity." Id. at 964 
In the case at bar, the plaintiff-lender, Associates was 
not a sold-out junior. Associates had an attorney present at 
the senior lienholder's foreclosure sale who acted on his 
client's instructions and submitted a bid in the sum of $26,000, 
an amount well below Associates' appraisal of the property. 
This presents a fact situation not previously considered by 
this Court but which has been addressed in the state of Cali-
fornia . 
In Citrus State Bank v. McKendrick, 263 Cal. Rptr. 781 
(Cal. App., 2 Dist., 1989), Citrus State Bank, a junior trust 
deed holder, was the successful bidder at a senior lienholder's 
non-judicial trustee's sale. [See Addendum, p. A-12 for full 
text of opinion.] Fourteen months later the bank filed for a 
deficiency against the trustor, McKendrick. The trial court 
-8-
entered a judgment of nonsuit on the bank's complaint and the 
bank appealed. On appeal, the California Court of Appeals 
considered the precise issue of whether the three month period 
of limitation provided by California Code of Civil Procedure 
§580a [See Addendum, page A-2 for text of statute.] applied 
to bar an action brought beyond that period by a junior trust 
deed holder who has purchased the secured property at a fore-
closure sale of a more senior trust deed. Section 580a of 
the California Code of Civil Procedure was, at the time, 
worded substantially similar to the language found in Utah 
Code Annotated §57-1-32 [See Addendum, p. A-1 ] 
Citrus State Bank argued on appeal that the language 
"sale under such deed of trust" (emphasis added) meant that 
the three month limitation is imposed only on the holder of 
the deed of trust under which the foreclosure sale is being 
conducted. The California Court of Appeals rejected this 
argument, stating: 
". . .[W]e conclude that a junior lienholder who 
purchases the secured property at a senior fore-
closure sale is bound by section 580a. It pro-
vides the exclusive remedy if such junior desires 
to recover a deficiency judgment following a non-
judicial foreclosure." Id. at 786. 
In its discussion in reaching that conclusion, the court 
said: 
"Finally, we reject the Bank's contention that 
section 580a is limited by its terms to the 
foreclosing senior. In the context of a 
purchasing junior, there is no reason to make 
the distinction urged by the bank. A junior 
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lienholder effectively steps into the shoes of 
the senior when he purchases the secured property 
at the senior's foreclosure." Id. at 786-787. 
(emphasis added) 
In that opinion, the court distinguished the case of 
Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierghino, 59 Cal. 2d 35, 27 Cal. Rptr. 
873, 378 P. 2d 97 (1963), a case relied upon by this Court in 
decdiding City Consumer Services, Inc. v. Peters, supra, 
since Roseleaf involved a "sold-out" junior. The California 
Court of Appeals noted that: 
"Unlike the sold-out junior the security for the 
payment of [the purchasing junior 1 ienholder's] 
debt has not been rendered valueless, but rather 
he is protected by the difference between the 
fair value of the property and the amount of the 
foreclosure sale price. Upon completion of the 
senior foreclosure sale he acquires an unredeemable 
title which he is free to resell. Citrus State 
Bank v. McKendrick, supra, at 787. 
This result is consistent with the reasoning of the Utah 
Court of Appeals in G. Adams Limited Partnership v. Durbano, 
supra, which declined to interpret §57-1-32 as barring an 
action by a sold-out junior who "...did not participate in 
the decision." Id. at 964. Neither does this result contra-
dict the holding in City Consumer Services, Inc. v. Peters, 
supra, which recognized that a sold-out junior lienholder who 
becomes unsecured as a result of the senior foreclosure is 
not seeking a "deficiency" and therefore not subject to the 
provisions of Utah Code Annotated §57-1-32. 
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In this case, Associates Financial Services did participate 
in the trustee's sale and was, in fact, secured for a substan-
tial portion of the obligation then due on the Slaughs' promi-
ssory note. Associates was therefore as fully secured after 
the trustee sale as it was prior to the sale. It knew what 
the value of the property was by virtue of its own appraisal 
[R. 34-35] and it had actual knowledge of the federal tax 
liens encumbering the property. [R. 154 1112] 
The three month limitation period imposed by Utah Code 
Annotated §57-1-32, if applied, would mandate that Associates 
should have initiated an action for deficiency on or before 
May 28, 1989. In fact the action was commenced on October 
12, 1989, almost eight months after the senior foreclosure 
sale. To allow Associates to do so in this case is contrary 
to the purpose underlying the three month limitation provision 
of the statute. 
In Standard Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Kirkbride, 
821 P. 2d 1136 (Utah 1991), this Court considered the operation 
and effect of §57-1-32: 
"A more sensible view of the operation of the three 
month limitation period contained in section 57-1-32 
is that its primary purpose is satisfied when the 
foreclosing party provides notice to the debtor that 
a deficiency will be sought by filing the action. 
. . .Prior to the enactment of specific trust deed 
foreclosure statutes, the general rule was that 
after foreclosing on the property securing the note, 
the mortgagor could wait the period of the statute 
of limitations to give a debtor notice that it would 
seek a deficiency judgment, [citation omitted] This 
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delay could leave the debtor in a state of finan-
cial uncertainty for years. Under trust deed 
statutes such as section 57-1-32, the creditor 
is given a speedy remedy of foreclosure and 
sale, but in exchange, it must promptly put 
the debtor on notice as to whether it will 
seek any balance due by commencing an action. 
Once this notice is given or the three month 
time period runs, the debtor can plan accord-
ingly." at 1138. 
Associates Financial Services, as a purchasing junior 
lienholder, stepped into the shoes of the senior seller and 
became effectively bound by the provisions of §57-1-32. At 
the time the action should have been commenced, the Internal 
Revenue Service had not exercised its redemption rights and 
Associates still held the property as a secured creditor, all 
rights of the Slaughs having been cut off at the sale. Having 
made the election at the sale to bid an amount significantly 
below market value with actual knowledge of the federal tax 
liens of record against the property, and having thereafter 
failed to commence an action to seek a deficiency within the 
three month limitation period provided by §57-1-32, Associates 
is barred from seeking a deficiency in any amount. 
B. ASSOCIATES FINANCIAL SERVICES IS LIMITED IN ITS 
RECOVERY, IF ANY, TO THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE 
OBLIGATION OWED AND THE FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE 
PROPERTY. 
Even if Associates Financial Services were permitted to 
sue on the note, §57-1-32 limits Associates' recovery to 
costs, attorney's fees, and deficiency in excess of $48,500.00, 
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the fair market value of the property at the time of the 
foreclosure sale. 
The fair market value provision of §57-1-32 was an issue 
examined by this Court in City Consumer Services, Inc. v. 
Peters, supra. Consistent with the Court's ruling that a 
sold-out junior became unsecured and was therefore not pursuing 
a "deficiency judgment," the Court held that City Consumer 
Services was not limited by the fair market value provisions 
of §57-1-32 from pursuing its claim against the debtor personally 
Id. at 239 • 
Where, however, the junior lienholder is not "sold-out," 
the fair value limitations of the statute should logically 
apply. The purpose of the fair market provision of §57-1-32 
is to protect the debtor, who in a non-judicial foreclosure 
has no right of redemption, from a creditor who could purchase 
the property at the sale for a low price and then hold the 
debtor liable for a large deficiency. First Security Bank of 
Utah, N.A. v. Felger, 658 F. Supp. 175, 183 (D. Utah 1987); 
Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, supra, 378 P. 2d at 99. 
In Citrus State Bank v. McKendrick, supra, the California 
Court of Appeals recognized the holding in Roseleaf that a 
sold-out junior lienholder was not bound by the fair value 
limitations of the California anti-deficiency statute. The 
court noted, however, that . . ."there is a real distinction 
between a junior lienor who purchases the secured property at 
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a senior sale and a junior who is ' sold-out ' ." 263 Cal. Rptr. 
at 785. Addressing this distinction the court stated: 
"This is a distinction that was not present in 
Roseleaf. 'The junior in Roseleaf did not pur-
chase at the senior's sale. To apply the fair 
value limitations to that junior would result 
in the amount of his deficiency being limited 
by the amount of someone else's bid, a factor 
over which he has no control. However, once 
a junior chooses to purchase, it is equitable 
to apply the fair value limitations to him.1" 
Id. at 785, quoting from Walter E. Heller 
Western, Inc. v. Bloxham, 176 Cal. App. 3d 266, 
221 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1985). 
In the case at bar, there is every reason to apply the 
fair value limitations to Associates, the plaintiff in the 
case below. Associates submitted a low bid at the senior 
foreclosure sale ($26,000.00) and could have, absent the fair 
value limitations of §57-1-32, resold the property for $48,500 
and then sued the Slaughs for the difference between the 
amount owing on the promissory note and the amount of the bid 
in excess of the amount paid to the senior lienholder. This 
is precisely the type of conduct that the statute is supposed 
to prevent. Whereas a "sold-out" junior is unsecured by 
reason of the senior sale and is therefore not seeking a 
"deficiency", a purchasing junior lienholder steps into the 
shoes of the senior lienholder and, as a secured creditor, 
should be fairly bound by the same rules which govern, or 
would govern, the senior. Otherwise, the purchasing junior 
reaps the benefit of the non-judicial foreclosure provisions 
of the Utah Trust Deed Act, Utah Code Annotated §§57-1-19 to 
36, i.e., it receives title to the property which cannot be 
_ 1 A _ 
redeemed by the debtor via the less-expensive, non-judicial 
foreclosure without the quid pro quo, i.e., the limitations 
on the creditors right to a deficiency judgment. City Consumer 
Services, Inc. v. Peters, supra, at 238; First Security Bank 
of Utah, N.A. v. Felger, supra, at 183; Walter E. Heller 
Western, Inc. v. Bloxham, 176 Cal. App. 3d 266, 270-271; 
Coppola v. Superior Court (Singer), 259 Cal. Rptr. 811, 820 
(Cal. App., 2 Dist., 1989) . 
The decision to submit a bid much lower than the appraised 
value of the real property was a decision made by Associates 
alone, not influenced by the debtors or a third party. By 
making the decision to bid at the senior sale, Associates 
became subject to the fair value limitations imposed by Utah 
Code Annotated §57-1-32. It cannot now complain that because 
it did not have the opportunity, because of intervening events, 
to do what the statute proscribes, that the statute should 
not now govern its action against the defendants who relinquished 
their right of redemption irretrievably when Associates received 
a trustee's deed pursuant to its successful bid at the sale. 
If this were the case, then logic and fairness would compel 
that the Slaughs be accorded their redemption rights which 
they gave up, as quid pro quo, for the fair value limitations 
imposed on the creditor under §57-1-32. 
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Since Associates has availed itself of the benefits of 
the Utah Trust Deed Act, it should also be bound by the corres-
ponding limitations of the Act. Its recovery against the 
Slaughs should be limited to the amount by which the amount 
of its indebtedness and the amount of the senior lienholder's 
indebtedness exceed the fair market value of the property at 
the time of the foreclosure sale. 
C. ASSOCIATES FINANCIAL SERVICES IS BARRED BY THE 
"ONE-ACTION" RULE FROM COMMENCING AN ACTION AGAINST 
THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS. 
Utah Code Annotated §78-37-1 [See Addendum, p. A-4 for 
full text of statute.] has come to be known as the "one-action 
rule" and has been held to apply to trust deeds as well as 
mortgages. Lockhart Company v. Equitable Realty, Inc., 657 
P. 2d 1333 (Utah 1983) 
In City Consumer Services, Inc. v. Peters, supra, the 
Court addressed the effect of the one-action rule on a sold-out 
junior lienor. Citing the earlier case of Cache Valley Banking 
Co. v. Logan Lodge No. 1453, B.P.O.E., 88 Utah 577, 56 P. 2d 
1046 (1936) as authority, the Court held that the one-action 
rule does not apply to a sold-out junior. City Consumer 
Services, Inc. v. Peters, 815 P. 2d at 237. Where, however, 
as in the case at bar, the junior lienholder is not "sold-out", 
the one-action rule would logically still apply. There is no 
reason to treat the purchasing junior lienholder differently 
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than the foreclosing senior lienholder since the purchasing 
junior retains its secured status after the senior sale. 
An exception to the one-action rule has been recognized 
where the security interest in the real property has been 
depleted and is valueless through no fault of the mortgagee. 
In such cases the courts have held that an action may be 
maintained directly upon the personal obligation. Cache 
Valley Banking Co. v. Logan, supra, at 1049. 
What constitutes "fault" of the mortgagee for purposes of 
this exception was considered by the U.S. District Court in 
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Felger, supra: 
"The courts have found that a creditor is precluded 
from seeking a deficiency only where the creditor's 
negligence, or illegal conduct, has resulted in the 
loss of the collateral, or where the creditor 
voluntarily released the junior lien. Thus it has 
been held that a secured creditor was barred from 
recovery when (1) The creditor lost its lien because 
of a failure to record a notice of assignment of 
mortgage, Donaldson v. Grant, 49 P. 799 (Utah 1897); 
(2) The creditor released its lien because of its 
belief that there was no equity in the collateral, 
Lockhart, supra; (3) The creditor disposed of the 
collateral by private sale under an illegal self-
help remedy, Rein v. Callaway, 65 P. 63 (Idaho 
1901); and, (4) The creditor lost its interest in 
the collateral because of its failure to present 
a claim in a related probate proceeding, Hibernia 
Savings & Loan Society v. Thornton, 42 P. 447 
(Calif. 1895)." at 182. * 
In the case at bar, Associates Financial Services argued 
in the court below that the fault of the defendants in not 
paying the first trust deed obligation and the federal tax 
liens was the "fault" to be analyzed in considering this 
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issue. This begs the question in an important respect. If 
the debtor's "fault" in not paying the senior lienholder were 
the determining factor to be considered by the court, then 
the inquiry would end there in every case. The purchasing 
junior lienor could conduct himself as he pleased at the 
senior sale, dispose of the property afterward in whatever 
manner he desired, and then simply point at the debtor and 
declare, "This is all your fault for not paying the senior 
lienholder." The one-action rule would then never apply 
under any circumstances where more than one lien encumbers 
the property. This clearly is not the intent of the statute. 
[See, e.g., Lockhart Company v. Equitable Realty, Inc., supra] 
It is the actions of the secured creditor during and after 
the foreclosure sale that must be scrutinized by the court to 
determine the "fault", or absence thereof, which would compel 
the application of the one-action rule or a finding that the 
exception should apply. 
In the case at bar, Associates Financial Services was as 
secured after the senior sale as it was before the sale. It 
was only by virtue of decisions that Associates made during 
the sale and afterward that the security was lost. Associates 
knew what the fair market value of the property was prior to 
the sale [R. 34-35] and had actual and constructive notice of 
all matters affecting title to the property. [R. 154 1F12] 
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Armed with this knowledge, Associates nevertheless elected 
to submit a bid at the sale in the amount of $26,000.00, 
$22,500.00 less than the appraised value of the property. 
Thereafter the Internal Revenue Service exercised it redemption 
rights and redeemed the property by paying to Associates the 
amount of its bid, $26,000.00. 
POINT 1: Associates was Negligent in Submitting a Bid 
Substantially Below the Market Value of the 
Property. 
By submitting a bid in the sum of $26,000.00 in the face 
of recorded I.R.S. tax liens against the property, Associates 
made a knowing election, having stepped into the shoes of the 
first lienholder, to accept that sum (although this is question-
able as well—see Point 2, p. 20 ) if it were tendered by the 
Internal Revenue Service in redemption of the property. The 
sum of $26,000.00 was only sufficient to the pay the amount 
owing the senior lienholder ($20,300.00), leaving Associates 
only $5,700.00 to apply to the obligation owing it by the 
Slaughs. [R. 153 1F8; R. 154 1114] Such conduct on the part of 
Associates was clearly negligent given the knowledge that it 
had prior to the foreclosure sale. 
A purchaser at a trustee's sale is chargeable with notice 
of any defects or irregularities as could have been discovered 
by careful attention and diligent inquiry. Thompson on Real 
Property, Power of Sale Mortgages and Trust Deeds, §5185 
(1957 Ed.) Actual notice or knowledge of a tax lien is not 
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required by federal statute [See Dimmitt & Owens Financial, 
Inc. v. Unique Industries, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 14 (D. 111. 
1983).] nor is it required by state law. Utah Code Annotated 
§57-4a-2 provides, in pertinent part: 
"A recorded document imparts notice of its contents, 
regardless of any defect, irregularity, or omission 
in its execution, attestation, or acknowledgement. 
it 
. . . 
The doctrine of caveat emptor still applies to foreclosure 
sales under powers contained in deeds of trust. Randolph v. 
Simpson, 500 S.W. 2d 289 (Mo. App. 1973) 
Associates was at fault in submitting a low bid having no 
relationship to either the fair market value of the security 
or to the sum of the amount owing on its promissory note and 
the amount it was obligated to pay the senior lienholder to 
purchase the property. This was an election made by a sophisti-
cated creditor in the face of facts and circumstances that 
should have prompted a reasonable and prudent businessman to 
act otherwise. 
POINT 2: Associates was at Fault by Acquiescing in 
the Redemption Amount Tendered by the 
Internal Revenue Service. 
The amount which the I.R.S. was required to pay to Associates 
to exercise its right of redemption under Title 26 U.S.C. 
§7425 [See Addendum, P. A-5 , for text of pertinent portion 
of statute.] is governed by Title 28 U.S.C. §2410(d) which 
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reads: 
"In any case in which the United States redeems 
real property under this section or section7425 
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, the amount 
to be paid for such property shall be the sum of--
(1) the actual amount paid by the purchaser 
at such sale (which, in the case of a 
purchaser who is the holder of the lien 
being foreclosed, shall include the amount 
of the obligation secured by such lien to 
the extent satisfied by reason of such 
sale), 
(2) interest on the amount paid (as determined 
under paragraph (1) at 6 per cent per annum 
from the date of such sale, and
 ( 
(3) the amount (if any) equal to the excess 
of (A) the expenses necessarily incurred in 
connection with such property, over (B) the 
income from such property plus (to the 
extent such property is used by the purchaser) 
a reasonable rental value of such property." 
An explanation of the procedures to be followed is contained 
in 26 Code of Federal Regulations §400.5-1. [See Addendum, 
P. A- 9 for text.] Paragraph (c) of the regulation contains 
a discussion of the amount to be paid and provides examples. 
The Utah Trust Deed Act arguably fits in example (2). It is 
therefore equally arguable that , in the instant case, that 
the Internal Revenue Service should have paid Associates the 
sum of $48,500.00 ($42,800.00 plus the $5,700.00 already 
received by Associates to apply on its obligation), the fair 
market value of the property. 
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Associates argued in the court below that since the sale 
was redeemed by the I.R.S. that no sale ever occurred to 
Associates Financial Services, as purchaser. This line of 
reasoning makes no sense in the context of a foreclosure sale 
and redemption by the Internal Revenue Service. Who would be 
the "purchaser" under 28 U.S.C. §2410(d)(1) if this were the 
case? This argument was implicity rejected by the Ninth 
Circuit United States Court of Appeals in the case of Bank of 
Hemet v. United States, 643 F. 2d 661 (9th Cir. 1981). This 
case involved a bank which was a second lienholder and which 
purchased at the senior lienholder's foreclosure sale. The 
United States claimed a right to redeem by reason of a federal 
tax lien. The central issue in the case was what redemption 
price the government should have paid to the bank. An issue 
related to that question was whether the provisions of §580a 
of the California Civil Code (the California anti-deficiency 
statute) should be applied to the Bank. (The court held that 
§580a did apply to the Bank, a purchasing junior. Id. at 669) 
The court first addressed the amount payable in redemption 
and concluded that, given the facts in that case, that the 
redemption price to which the Bank was entitled pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. §2410(d) was that amount by which the fair market 
value of the property at the time of sale exceeded the amount 
the Bank paid to purchase the property, plus that purchase 
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price paid by the Bank to acquire the property at the foreclosure 
sale, plus such interest as was proper. In arriving at this 
conclusion, the court reasoned that the amount of the Bank's 
debt "satisfied by reason of such sale," 
11
. . .[I]s the amount by which the fair market 
value of the property at the time of sale 
exceeded the amount paid by the Bank for the 
property at the time of sale. This is the 
'(A) portion1 of the section 2410(d) redemp-
tion price while the amount paid by the Bank 
for the property of the sale is the '(B) 
portion.'" JkL at 670. 
Applying this analysis to the facts in the case at bar 
yields the following result: The "(A)" portion of the §2410(d) 
redemption price--the amount of Associates' debt satisfied by 
reason of such sale — should have been the amount by which the 
fair market value of the property ($48,500.00) exceeded the 
amount paid by Associates for the property at the time of 
sale ($26,000.00). The "(A)" portion is therefore $22,500.00. 
The "(B)" portion of the §2410(d) redemption price is the 
amount paid by Associates to discharge the first lienholder's 
claim ($20,300.00). 
The total redemption price payable by the government to 
Associates Financial Services should have been $42,800.00. 
This amount, added to the $5,700.00 Associates received to 
apply to Slaughs' indebtedness, yields the figure of $48,500.00, 
the fair market value of the property. 
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Associates therefore compounded its first error of submitting 
a low bid by failing to require the Internal Revenue Service 
to pay the proper redemption price as mandated by the federal 
statutes and regulations pertaining thereto. This conduct on 
the part of Associates Financial Services was no less negligent 
than the conduct referred to by Judge Winder in First Security 
Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Felger, supra, at 182. Associates is 
therefore precluded from seeking a deficiency judgment against 
the Slaughs by Utah Code Annotated §78-37-1. 
CONCLUSION 
Associates Financial Services was time-barred from initiating 
its action more than three months after the foreclosure sale 
by Utah Code Annotated §57-1-32. As a purchasing junior 
lienor at the senior sale, Associates stepped into the shoes 
of the senior lienholder and, as a secured creditor, was 
bound to give the debtors notice of its intent to seek a 
deficiency within the time prescribed by law. The judgment 
of the lower court should therefore be reversed. 
Even if Associates were not absolutely precluded from 
bringing its action for a deficiency against the Slaughs, 
having derived the benefits of the non-judicial foreclosure 
afforded by the Utah Trust Deed Act, Associates is also bound 
by the limitations imposed and its deficiency, if any, is 
limited to the excess of the obligation owing over and above 
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the fair market value of the property. The case should be 
reversed and remanded to the lower court for further hearing 
to determine the amount of deficiency due, consistent with 
Utah Code Annotated §57-1-32. 
Associates Financial Services is further barred from 
commencing its action in the court below against the defendants-
appellants by the "one-action rule11 as set forth in Utah Code 
Annotated §78-37-1. Associates'conduct during the foreclosure 
sale proceedings and thereafter constituted "fault11 within 
the meaning of the recognized exception to the one-action 
rule and the judgment of the court below, being based on 
erroneous conclusions of law, should be reversed and a judgment 
of nonsuit entered in favor of the defendants. 
Respectfully submitted this day of March, 1992. 
FRANKLIN L. SLAU6H 
Pro Se and as Attorney 
for Cheryl D. Slaugh 
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57-1-32. Sale of trust property by trustee — Action to re-
cover balance due upon obligation for which 
trust deed was given as security. 
At any time within three months after any sale of property under a trust 
deed, as hereinabove provided, an action may be commenced to recover the 
balance due upon the obligation for which the trust deed was given as secu-
rity, and in such action the complaint shall set forth the entire amount of the 
indebtedness which was secured by such trust deed, the amount for which 
such property was sold, and the fair market value thereof at the date of sale. 
Before rendering judgment, the court shall find the fair market value at the 
date of sale of the property sold. The court may not render judgment for more 
than the amount by which the amount of the indebtedness with interest, costs, 
and expenses of sale, including trustee's and attorney's fees, exceeds the fair 
market value of the property as of the date of the sale. In any action brought 
under this section, the prevailing party shall be entitled to collect its costs and 
reasonable attorney fees incurred in bringing an action under this section. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 14; 1985, ch. and third sentences; added the fourth sentence; 
68, § 4. and made minor changes in phraseology and 
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amend- punctuation, 
ment deleted language from the end of the first 
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Title 8 JUDGMENT IN GENERAL § 580a 
A complaint for divorce contained no receiver all of the property hereinabove 
averments concerning property or the described/* and that said receiver hold the 
husband's ability to pay alimony, and same subject to the court's order. ^ The 
prayed for divorce and for such other re- judgment was erroneous, under this sec-
lief as might be just and within the juris- tion. where there was no answer. Foley 
diction of the court The part of a de- v. Foley (1898) 52 P. 122, 120 C. 33, 65 
fault judgment for divorce which awarded Am.St.R. 147. 
alimony was not void, tinder this section, 
nor subject to collateral attack on the no. Review, default judgment 
ground that the relief awarded was in ex-
 T . ^^^i^.^ M A*#M M „,),*,.* A» 
cess of that prayed for. Cohen v. Cohen J ? r i ™ S * f J ^ ^ ^ f 
(1906) 88 P. 267. 150 C. 99, 11 Ann.Cas. f a u l t i n f * * « * " * • admitted m their an-
i i T ^ ; • ' swcr that property involved no longer be-
longed to them as trustees but that it had 
A corporation was joined as defendant been conveyed to the beneficiaries, any er-
in a divorce suit. The relief asked was ror in decree granting relief beyond that 
that it be enjoined from disposing of cer- prayed for in the complaint was not prej-
tain property conveyed by defendant's ndicial to such defendants. Oil Tool Ex-
husband to i t The judgment required de- change v. Schuh (1945) 153 P.2d 976, 67 
fendants to "transfer and convey to said C.A.2d 288. 
§ 580a. Action for deficiency judgment after foredosore or trus-
teed sale; complaint; appraisal; deficiency computed 
on basis of fair market value; limitation of actions; 
necessity of sale 
Whenever a money judgment is sought for the balance due upon 
an obligation for the payment of which a deed of trust or mortgage 
with power of sale upon real property or any interest therein was 
given as security, following the exercise of the power of sale in such 
deed of trust or mortgage, the plaintiff shall set forth in his com-
plaint the entire amount of the indebtedness which was secured by 
said deed of trust or mortgage at the time of sale, the amount for 
which such real property or interest therein was sold and the fair 
market value thereof at the date of sale and the date of such sale. 
Upon the application of either party made at least 10 days before the 
time of trial the court shall, and upon its own motion the court at 
any time may, appoint one of the inheritance tax referees provided 
for by law to appraise the property or the interest therein sold as of 
the time of sale. Such referee shall file his appraisal with the clerk 
and tfat^ same^hnB-hM f^i^ ssible in evidence. Such referee Shall take" 
and subscribe an oath to be attached to the appraisal that he has tru-
ly, honestly and impartially appraised the property to the best of his 
knowledge and ability. Any referee so appointed may be called and 
examined as a witness by any party or by the court itself. The court 
must fix the compensation of such referee in an amount as deter-
mined by the court to be reasonable, but such fees shall not exceed 
similar fees for similar services in the community where such serv-
ices are rendered, which may be taxed and allowed in like manner as 
other costs. Before rendering any judgment the court shall find the 
fair market value of the real property, or interest therein sold, at the 
16 CalXode—fc 59 
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time of sale. The court may render judgment for not more than the 
amount by which the entire amount of the indebtedness due at the 
time of sale exceeded the fair market value of the real property or in-
terest therein sold at the time of sale with interest thereon from the 
date of the sale; provided, however, that in no event shall the 
amount of said judgment, exclusive of interest after the date of sale, 
exceed the difference between the amount for which the property was 
sold and the entire amount of the indebtedness secured by said deed 
of trust or mortgage. Any such action must be brought within three 
months of the time of sale under such deed of trust or mortgage. No 
judgKSffF s^dUhbe-rendered in any such-action until the-real-property 
or interest therein has first been sold pursuant to the terms of such 
deed of trust or mortgage, unless such real property or interest there-
in has become valueless. / 
(Added by Stats;l933, c. ^42, p. 1672, § 4. Reenacted by Stats.1935, c. 650, 
p. 1805, § 4. Ainended by Stats.1968, c. 450, p. 1070, § 2; Stats.1970, c. 
1282, p. 2320, § 1, eff. July 1,1971.) 
Historical Note 
This section was added in 1933 as a The 1970 amendment substituted inher-
part of an act which also amended Civil itance tax "referees" for "appraisers". 
Code | 2924, added Civil Code §§ 2924b,
 m . -ftOK . , . . , .. f ,, 
2924c, 2924%, and added Code of Civii . J h e 1 9 3 5 a c t a U o s t a i n e d the follow-
Sec 9. It is the intent of this act to Procedure f§ 580b, 580c, 725a. Section 9
 i n
^ 
of the 1933 act was a partial validity sec-tion. *—»"J —
 rCenact sections 2924, 2924b and 2924c of 
the Civil Code and sections 580a, 580b, 
The 1935 act, which reenacted this sec- 580c and 725a of the Code of Civil Proce-
tion, also reenacted all of the sections dure in order to continue the same in ef-
which were affected by the 1933 act, ex- feet subsequent to September 1, 1936, and 
cept Civil Code § 2924%. Section 8 of remove any ambiguity created by the lan-
the 1935 act was a partial validity provi- guage of jBection 2924% of the Civil Code 
sion. as added by an act approved June 2, 1933, 
The 1S68 amendment substituted, in the " *° *}? ?*? f ^ J J T f w " ^ * * £ £ mw*\> ...fM<u *K. „nrA. •«;„ . n .„„„„. *»v«- I* u intended that sections 2024, aixtt senten^, thewords «ui an amount ^ ^
 d ^ ^ f a c w l ^ d 
m u n i ^ h U ^ .er^eTarT rSide^ w t t o u t « * « « " * • * • * » « * " • « • " 
for the words "not to exceed five dollars Operative effect of StatsJ.970, c 1282, 
per day, and expenses for the time actual- p. 2320, see Historical Note under Reve-
ly engaged in such appraisal". nue and Taxation Code 113315. 
Forms 
See West's California Code Forms, Civil Procedure. 
Cross References 
Attorney's authority to conduct sale under power of sale, see Civil Code 5 2924a. 
Foreclosure and deficiency judgment, see J 726. 
Inheritance tax referee, appointment, see Probate Code $ 605; Revenue and Taxation 
Code { 14501 et seq. 
Invalidity of waiver of rights or privileges conferred by this section upon borrower, see 
Civil Code § 2953. 
Loggers and lumbermen's lien, foreclosure, see Civil Code $ 3065a. 
Mechanic's lien foreclosure, deficiency judgment, see Civil Code J 3151. 
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78-37-1 JUDICIAL CODE 
CHAPTER 37 
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE 
Section 
78-37-1. 
78-37-2. 
78-37-3. 
78-37-4. 
78-37-5. 
Form of action — Judgment — Spe-
cial execution. 
Deficiency judgment — Execution. 
Necessary parties — Unrecorded 
rights barred. 
Sales — Disposition of surplus 
moneys. 
Sales — When debt due in install-
ments. 
Section 
78-37-6. 
78-37-7. 
78-37-8. 
78-37-9. 
Right of redemption — Sales by par-
cels — Of land and water stock. 
Repealed. 
Restraining possessor from injuring 
property. 
Attorney fees. 
78-37-1. Form of action — Judgment — Special execution. 
There can be one action for the recovery of any debt or the enforcement of 
any right secured solely by mortgage upon real estate which action must be in 
accordance with the provisions of this chapter. Judgment shall be given ad-
judging the amount due, with costs and disbursements, and the sale of mort-
gaged property, or some part thereof, to satisfy said amount and accruing 
costs, and directing the sheriff to proceed and sell the same according to the 
provisions of law relating to sales on execution, and a special execution or 
order of sale shall be issued for that purpose. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-37-1; L. 1965, ch. 172, § 1. 
Cross-references. — Execution and pro-
ceedings supplemental thereto, Rule 69, 
U.R.C.P. 
lYust deeds, § 57-1-19 et seq. 
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mail or by personal service, not less than 25 days prior to such 
sale, to the Secretary. 
(2) Consent to sale.—Notwithstanding the notice require-
ment of subsection (b)(2)(C), a sale described in subsection (b) 
of property shall discharge or divest such property of the lien 
or title of the United States if the United States consents to the 
sale of such property free of such lien or title. 
(3) Sale of perishable goods.—Notwithstanding the notice 
requirement of subsection (b)(2)(C), a sale described in subsec-
tion (b) of property liable to perish or become greatly reduced 
in price or value by keeping, or which cannot be kept without 
great expense, shall discharge or divest such property of the 
lien or title of the United States if notice of such sale is given 
(in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary) in 
writing, by registered or certified mail or by personal service, 
to the Secretary before such sale. The proceeds (exclusive of 
co^ts) of such sale shall be held as a fund subject to the liens 
artd claims of the United States, in the same manner and with 
the same priority as such liens and claims had with respect to 
the property sold, for not less than 30 days after the date of 
such sale. 
(4) Forfeitures of land sales contracts.—For purposes of 
subsection (b), a sale of property includes any forfeiture of a 
land sales contract. 
(d) Redemption by United States.— 
(1) Right to redeem.—In the case of a sale of real property to 
which subsection (b) applies to satisfy a hen prior to that of the 
United States, the Secretary may redeem such property within 
the period of 120 days from the date of such sale or the period 
allowable for redemption under local law, whichever is longer. 
(2) Amount to be paid.—In any case in which the United 
States redeems real property pursuant to paragraph (1), the 
amount to be paid for such property shall be the amount 
prescribed by subsection (d) of section 2410 of title 28 of the 
United States Code. 
(3) Certificate of redemption.— 
(A) In general.—In any case in which real property is 
redeemed by the United States pursuant to this subsection, 
the Secretary shall apply to the officer designated by 1QC^ 
law, if any, for the documents necessary to evidence tn 
fact of redemption and to record title to such property * 
the name of the United States. If no such officer is desig-
nated bv local law or if such officer fails to issue su 
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documents, the Secretary shall execute a certificate of re-
demption therefor. 
(B) Filing.—The Secretary shall, without delay, cause 
such documents or certificate to be duly recorded in the 
proper registry of deeds. If the State in which the real 
property redeemed by the United States is situated has not 
by law designated an office in which such certificate may 
be recorded, the Secretary shall file such certificate in the 
office of the clerk of the United States district court for the 
judicial district in which such property is situated. 
(C) Effect.—A certificate of redemption executed by the 
Secretary shall constitute prima facie evidence of the regu-
larity of such redemption and shall, when recorded, trans-
fer to the United States all the rights, title, and interest in 
and to such property acquired by the person from whom 
the United States redeems such property by virtue of the 
sale of such property. 
(Added Pub.L. 89-719, Title I, § 109, Nov. 2, 1966. 80 Stat. 1141, and 
amended Pub.L. 94-455, Title XIX, § 1906(b) (13) (A). Oct. 4, 1976, 90 Stat. 
1834; Pub.L. 99-514, Title XV, § 1572(a). Oct. 22, 1986. 100 Stat. 2765.) 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Revision Notes and Legislative Reports Effective Dates 
1966 Act. Senate Report No. 1708. see 1986 Act. Section 1572(b) of Pub.L. 
1966 U.S.Code Cong, and Adm.News, p. 99-514 provided that: 'The amendment 
3722. made by subsection (a) [amending sub-
1976 Act. House Report Nos. 94-*58, fec; ( c ) o f l rh ls section] shall apply to 
94-1380, Senate Report No. 94-938. and forfeitures after the 30th day after the 
House Conference Report No. 94-1515. d a t e ° f !*ie e n a c l m e n l o f t h l s A c t [Oct. 
see 1976 U.S.Code Cong, and Adm.News. 22« 1 9 8 6 ] 
p. 2897. 1976 Act. Amendment by Pub.L. 
1986 Act. House Conference Report 9 4 ^ \ 5 effective the first day of the first 
No. 99-841 and Statement by President, m f o n t h w h l c h b e S i n s m o r e t h a n 90' £ays 
see 1986 U-S.Code Cong, and Adm.News. a f l e r 0 c L 4 ' 1 9 7 6 ' ** s e c t , o n 1 9 0 6 W o f p 4075 Pub.L. 94-455. set out as a note under 
section 6013 of this title. 
References in Text
 1 9 6 6 A c t S e c t l o n a p p h c a b I e a f t c r 
Sections 2410 of title 28 of the United
 N o v 2 1 9 6 6 j r e g a r d l e s s o f w h c n t h e t i t i e 
f a i e S , C ^ r ^ e r r e d t 0 ! i n T t C f ' l ^ i 2 4 1 ^ or hen of the United States arose or ofjitle 28, Judiciary and Judicial Proce-
 w h e n l h e h e n o r m l e r e s l o f a n o l h f i r p e r . 
re
* son was acquired, with certain excep-
Amendments t l o n s ' s e e § lH(aWc) of Pub.L. 89-719, 
1986 Amendment. Subsec. (c)(4). s e t o u l a s a n o l e u n d e r § 6 3 2 3 o f l h i s 
Pub.L. 99-514 added par. (4). m l e -
1976 Amendment. Pub.L. 94-455 Prior Provisions 
struck out "or his delegate" following A prior section 7425 was renumbered 
"Secretary", wherever appearing. 7434 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Civil remedies for satisfaction of unpaid fine, see 18 USCA § 3613. 
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actions in the State courts service upon the United States shall be 
made by serving the process of the court with a copy of the com-
plaint upon the United States attorney for the district in which the 
action is brought jor upon an assistant United States attorney or 
clerical employee designated by the United States attorney m writ-
ing filed with the clerk of the court in which the action is brought 
and by sending copies of the process and complaint, by registered 
mail, or by certified mail, to the Attorney General of the United 
States at Washington, District of Columbia In such actions the 
United States may appear and answer, plead or demur within sixty 
days after such seivice or such further time as the court may allow 
(c) A judgment or decree in such action or suit shall have the 
same effect respecting the discharge of the property from the mort-
gage or other hen held by the United States as may be provided 
with respect to such matters by the local law of the place where the 
court is situated However, an action to foreclose a mortgage or 
other hen, naming the United States as a pait\ under this section, 
must seek judicial sale A sale to satisfy a hen inferior to one of 
the United States shall be made subject to and without disturbing 
the hen of the United States, unless the United States consents that 
the property may be sold free of its hen and the proceeds divided as 
the parties may be entitled Where a sale of real estate is made to 
satisfy a hen prior to that of the United States the United States 
shall have one year from the date of sale within which to redeem, 
except that with respect to a hen arising under the internal revenue 
laws the period shall be 120 days or the period allowable for re-
demption under State law, whichever is longer, and in any case in 
which, under the provisions of section 505 of the Housing Act of 
1950, as amended (12 U S C 1701k), and subsection (d) of section 
1820 of title 38 of the United States Code, the right to redeem does 
not arise, there shall be no right of redemption In any case where 
the debt owing the United States is due, the United States may ask, 
by way of affirmative relief, for the foreclosure of its own hen and 
where property is sold to satisfy a first hen held by the United 
States, the United States may bid at the sale such sum, not exceed-
*ng the amount of its claim with expenses of sale, as may be direct-
e d
 by the head < or his delegate) of the department or agency of the 
United States which has charge of the administration of the laws in 
Aspect to which the claim of the United States arises 
(d) In any case in which the United States redeems real property 
under this section or section 7425 of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1 9 H the amount to be paid for such properU shall be the sum of— 
(1) the actual amount paid by the purchaser at such sale 
(which, in the case of a purchaser who is the holder cf the hen 
being foreclosed, shall include the amount of the obligation se-
cured b\ such hen to the extent satisfied b\ leason of such 
sale), 
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(2) interest on the amount paid (as determined under para-
graph (1)) at 6 percent per annum from the date of such sale, 
and 
(3) the amount (if any) equal to the excess of (A) the ex-
penses necessarily incurred in connection with such property, 
over (B) the income from such property plus (to the extent 
such property is used by the purchaser) a reasonable rental 
value of such property 
(e) Whenever any person has a lien upon any real or personal 
property, duly recorded m the jurisdiction in which the property is 
located, and a junior hen, other than a tax hen, in favor of the Unit-
ed States attaches to such property such person may make a writ-
ten request to the officer charged with the administration of the 
laws in respect of which the hen of the United States arises, to 
have the same extinguished If after appropriate lm estigation, it 
appears to such officer that the proceeds from the sale of the proper-
ty would be insufficient to wholly or partly satisfy the hen of the 
United States, or that the claim of the United States has been satis-
fied or by iapse of time or otherwise has become unenforceable, 
such officer shall so report to the Comptroller General who may is-
sue a certificate releasing the property from such hen 
June 25, 1948, c 646, 62 Stat 972, May 24, 1949, c 139, § 119, 63 
Stat 105, July 7, 1958, Pub L 85-508, § 12(h), 72 Stat 348, June 
11, 1960, PubL 86-507, § 1(20), 74 Stat 201, Nov 2, 1966, Pub L 
89-719, Title II, § 201, 80 Stat 1147 
H i s t o r i c a l a n d R e v i s i o n Notes 
Renser's Note 1948 Act Based on Mith respect to seruce of process and 
Title 28, U S C 1940 ed H &01 902 904, complaint upon the United States in suits 
905 (Max 4 193L, c 515 §§ 1, 2, 4 5 4S brought in State courts This is provid 
Stat 1528, 1529, Maj 17, 1932 c 190 4T ed for b\ rule 4(d)(4) of the Federal 
Stat 158, June 25 1936 c 80i, 49 Stat Rules of Ci\il Procedure (this title] with 
1921, June 6, 1910, c 242 54 Stat 234, respect to such suits in United States dis 
Dec 2, 19*2, c 656, f| 1-3 56 Stat 1026) tnct courts 
Provisions including the districts of References In Text The internal re*ve 
Hattaii and Puerto Rico and the District nue laws referred to in subsec (b), are 
Court of the United States for the Dis classified general!} to Title 26, Internal 
tnct of Columbia in section 901 of Title Revenue Code 
28, U S C , 1940 ed 'were omitted as co% 
ered by 'any district court See section Section 505 of the Housing Act of 1950 
451 of this title a s a m«J t td^ (12 U S C 1701k) and sub 
section (d) of section 1820 of title 38 of 
Prp\isions in section 902 of Title 28, t n e United States Code, referred to m 
USC 1940 ed, relating to process, vere s u usec (c), are classified respettneb to 
omitted as co\ered b\ Rule 4 of the Fed section 1701k of Title 12 Banks and Bank 
eral Rules of Cml Procedure (this title] in& * n d section 1820(d) of Title 38, Vet 
erans Benefits 
Changes were made in phraseolog\ 
Section 7425 of the Internal Re%enue 
1949 Act This amendment conform^ Code of 1954 referred to in subsec (d) 
the language of section 2410(b) of titu is classified to section 7425 of Title 26. 
28 U S C , with that of the prior law Internal Re\enue Code 
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formation described in subdivisions (i),t cprdance with the provisions ofpara-(i£, ifiii), and (iv) of^his" Subparagraph/* graj&rj^.,Xl.):.4^^isrsection, in such a 
.^U^The-name^and address off the case "trie' district director may, in his 
pel*sbn submitting the notice of sale. discretion, consent to the sale of the 
- (hi A copy of each Notice of J?ed£raC^ the 
^ a x l L i e r i r ( ^ States even though notice of 
•pfbperty to be sold, or the following the sale, is not^iy^n 25 days-prior to 
iiiformation as
 v : s ^ in which the 
Notifcerof Federal^kx :fienT~ u ^ -ftersbh who submitted a timely notice 
"4a> The internal revenue district does.. IXQU rece^ vB,- -more than 5 days 
namgdiheiwn,-----.^^ of the sale, written 
;(by The name and address of the tax-notification from the district, director 
payer, and _ ... „ .Uiat 4>hfx i^otice is" mad^quateTs the 
j&SinM-4aX*&^
 s n a i i be considered adequate for 
tfte notice 
(lift With respect to ttje property, .to 
Resold, thfe tP^w^^in#rroaii 
(a),A detailed description, including 
location, of the property affected by 
tbe notice (in the case of teaf proper-, 
ty, the street address, city, and State 
the purposes of this section, ~ 
:
 r(^s Acknowledgment- of notice. If a 
notice of sale described in paragraph 
(c) or (e)i of this section is submitted in 
i;;^dupijcatevto the district director with 
"a" written request that receipt of the 
_ nojycevbe: acknowledged and returned and the legal d e s c r i p t i o n , c o n t a i n e d * * ^ ^ S S ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ . ^ 
*&:title or deed t o ^ l ^ y « ^ ^ 
P v S ^ e , ^ ^ SEEKERS ^ f trtet 
S|H>. -*- J.—-*?**'* *-* - --director. The acknowledgment by the (6) The date, time, place, andj*rms i ^ ^ 
^4he-pr«posed^a^^f ^fce :rx^erty\ - ^^^^ o f t h e raeipt o f t n e n o t l c e* 
ajig i±) Disclosure of adequacy of-notice. 
(c) l n t h e c a s e ~ o f a s a l e o t perisri^ble The . district director for tne internal 
property described in paragrarHi^e) o f : ^vefnTe district in which the sale was 
this section, a statement of.tfie.rea- n e l d ^ authorized to disclose, to any 
sons why the property js believe^to be - P^Prj w n o n a s a proper interest, 
perishable. _ ^. />7 y\'-^^^&^f^^ ^''-^&i^B.te notice of sale 
approximate Wbiint Qfjjie •..- wi&.,g|y^n^ (1) of 
bh^at ionTln^c^ (f). Any person desir-
u
^iv) The 
pFincipal-obligatioiir 
secured by the lien sought to be en- ing this information should submit^  to 
forced and a^descrio^^ request-
BXpenles/<s^ uch as feg^P clearly describes the property 
sold, identifies th^^Lpplicable notice of -
^^ier^lives ?the reasons for requesting 
'ttte*'mformation, and states the name 
and address of the person making-theM 
- j&eqtaest: 
ing costs, etc.) which may be charged 
against the ^aieLProceeds*
 r ™, -•.^ ^ ; ^ ' 
¥~f2> inadequate notice. Except as oth-
erwise provided in this subparagraph, 
a notices! ^ai^deg^l^.mrparagrapy 
tcY of this section^whicn does not cdh- [T.D. 61944, 33 FR 734. Jan. 20,;;19JJ8; ^ 3 . j ^ . tain the information described in sub- . ,<«.* .
 T ^ « * izw 
paragraph < ©oof *«ais^rai^graptf H&£^ ™* ^^^ lbWi 
wifirnot be considered adequate by a §
 m^{ Redemption ^ rr i teUSi^s ^ district director. If-a distnet director ^ ; ^ - v ^ ^ : a r . -->- -•*-*:• ~* 
de:tf32tfine«" tfiat fch^n^fcicef "is vmaoV" * &%2&ope. The purpose of this sec-
iSquate, he'wiH1 give written notifica- tibn is to prescribe rules with respect 
tion of the items of mforrftatipn.whierr 
g|3ginadequate to the person who* sub-' 
ihitted the notice. In such event -a 
notice "complying with the provisions 
of this section J including the require-
mjent thattrie notice be given 25 days 
^io-^erproTisicnis^cdriCalned in section 
^42St5V, relating to redemption of real 
property by the United States. Section 
109 of the Federal JTax Lien Act of 
1966 (30 Stat. 114D amended the In-
tcrhal 5:Revenue Code of 1954 by 
prior to the sale in the case of a notice adding^ gjnew section.7A2§nrejating;t0 
<Jejscrj&ed^ ^^ ^ of tax lien£~effec1ive 
wbn^liiust l ^ g i v e n . However, in 4c- . after November 2,1966. 
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(b) Right to redeem—(I) In general. 
In the case of a nonjudicial sale of real 
property to satisfy a lien prior to the 
tax lien, the district director may 
redeem the property within the re-
demption period (as described in sub-
paragraph (2) of this paragraph (b)). 
The right of redemption of the United 
States exists under section 7425(d) 
even though the district director has 
consented to the sale under section 
7425(c)(2) and paragraph (d) of 
§ 400.4-1. For purposes of this section, 
the term "nonjudicial sale" shall have 
the same meaning as when used in 
paragraph (b)(1) of § 400.4-1. 
(2) Redemption period. For purposes 
of this section, the redemption period 
shall be— < 
(i) The period beginning with the 
date of the sale (as determined under 
paragraph (bXIXiv), (v), and (vi) of 
§ 400.4-1) and ending with the 120th 
day after such date, or 
(ii) The period for redemption of 
real property allowable, with resepct 
to other secured creditors, under local 
law of the place where the real proper-
ty is located, 
whichever is longer. 
(3) Limitations. In the event a sale 
does not ultimately discharge the 
property from the tax lien (whether 
by reason of local law or the provi-
sions of section 7425(b)), the provi-
sions of this section do not apply since 
the tax lien will continue to attach to 
the property after the sale. In a case 
in which the Internal Revenue Service 
is not entitled to a notice of sale under 
section 7425(b) and §400.4-1, the 
United States does not have a right of 
redemption under secton 7425(d). 
However, in such a case, if a tax lien 
has attached to the property at the 
time of sale, the United States has the 
same right of redemption, if any, 
which is afforded to any secured credi-
tor under the local law of the place in 
which the property is situated. 
(c) Amount to be paid—il) In gener-
al. In any case in which a district di-
rector exercises the right to redeem 
real property, the amount to be paid is 
the sum of the following amounts— 
(i) The actual amount paid for the 
property being redeemed (which, in 
the case of a purchaser who is the 
holder of the lien being foreclosed, 
shall include the amount of the obliga-
tion secured by such lien to the extent 
legally satisfied by reason of the sale); 
(ii) Interest on the amount paid (de-
scribed in subdivision (i) of this sub-
paragraph) at the sale by the purchas-
er of the real property computed at 
the rate of 6 percent per annum for 
the period from the date of the sale 
(as determined under paragraph 
(b)(l)(iv), (v), and (vi) of §400.4-1) to 
the date of redemption; and 
(iii) The amount, if any, equal to the 
excess of (a) the expenses necessarily 
incurred in connection with such prop-
erty by the purchaser, over (b) the 
income from such property realized by 
the purchaser plus a reasonable rental 
value of such property (to the extent 
the property is used by or with the 
consent of the purchaser, or is rented 
at less than its reasonable rental 
value). 
(2) Examples. The provisions of sub-
paragraph (lXi) of this paragraph (b), 
may be illustrated by the following ex-
amples: 
Example (2). A, a delinquent taxpayer, 
owns Blackacre located in X State upon 
which B holds a mortgage. After the mort-
gage is properly recorded, a notice of tax 
lien is filed which is applicable to Blackacre. 
Subsequently, A defaults on the mortgage 
and B forecloses on the mortgage which has 
an outstanding obligation in the amount of 
$100,000. At the foreclosure sale, B bids 
$50,000 and obtains title to Blackacre as a 
result of the sale. At the time of the foreclo-
sure sale, Blackacre has a fair market value 
of $75,000. Under the laws of X State, the 
mortgage obligation is fully satisfied as a 
result of the foreclosure sale and the mort-
gagee cannot obtain a deficiency judgment. 
Under subparagraph (l)(i) of this para-
graph, the district director must pay 
$100,000 in order to redeem Blackacre. 
Example (2). Assume the same facts as in 
example (1), except that under the laws of 
X State, the fair market value of the prop-
erty foreclosed is the amount of the obliga-
tion legally satisfied as a result of the fore-
closure sale, and in a case in which the 
amount of the obligation exceeds the 
amount of the fair market value of the 
property, the mortgagee has the right to a judgment for the deficiency computed as 
the difference between the obligation and 
the fair market value of the property. In 
such a case the district director must, under 
subparagraph (lXi) of this paragraph, pay 
$75,000 in order to redeem Blackacre, 
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whether or not B seeks a judgment for the 
deficiency 
Example (J) Assume the same facts as in 
example (1) except that under the laws of 
X State the amount bid is the amount of 
the obligation legally satisfied as a result of 
the foreclosure sale and in the case in 
which the amount of the obligation exceeds 
the amount bid the mortgagee has the 
right to a judgment for the deficiency com 
puted as the difference between the amount 
of the obligation and the amount bid In 
such a case the district director must under 
subparagraph (l)(i) of this paragraph pay 
$50,000 in order to redeem Blackacre 
whether or not B seeks a judgment for the 
deficiency 
(d) Certificate of redemption—(1) In 
general If a district director exercises 
the right of redemption of the United 
States described in paragraph (b) of 
this section, he shall apply to the offi-
cer designated by local law, if any, for 
the documents necessary to evidence 
the fact of redemption and to record 
title to the redeemed property in the 
name of the United States If no such 
officer has been designated by local 
law or if the officer designated by 
local law fails to issue the necessary 
documents, the district director is au-
thorized to issue a certificate of re-
demption for the property redeemed 
by the United States 
(2) Filing The district director shall, 
without delay, cause either the docu-
ments issued by the local officer or 
the certificate of redemption executed 
by the district director, described in 
subparagraph (1) of this paragraph 
(d), to be duly recorded in the proper 
registry of deeds If a certificate of re-
demption is issued by the district di-
rector and if the State in which the 
real proDerty redeemed by the United 
States is situated has not by law desig-
nated an office in which the certifi-
cate of redemption may be recorded, 
the district director shall file the cer-
tificate of redemption in the office of 
the clerk of the U S district court for 
the judicial district in which the re-
deemed property is situated 
(3) Effect of certificate of redemp-
tion, A certificate of redemption exe-
cuted prusuant to subparagraph (1) of 
this paragraph (d), shall constitute 
prima facie evidence of the regularity 
of the redemption When a certificate 
of redemption is recorded, it shall 
transfer to the United States all the 
rights, title, and interest m and to the 
redeemed property acquired by the 
person from ^hom the district direc 
tor redeemed the property by virtue of 
the sale of the property 
(4) Application for release of right of 
redemption Upon application of a 
party with a proper interest in the real 
property sold in a nonjudicial sale de 
scribed in section 7425(b) and para 
graph (b) of § 400 4-1, which real prop-
erty is subject to the right of redemp 
tion of the United States described in 
this section, the district director may, 
in his discretion, release the right of 
redemption with respect to the proper-
ty The application for the release 
shall be submitted in writing to a dis 
tnct director and shall contain such 
information as the district director 
may require If the district director de 
termines that the right of redemption 
of the United States is without value, 
no amount shall be required to be paid 
with respect to the release of the right 
of redemption 
[T D 6944, 33 FR 737 Jan 20 1968] 
PART 401—TEMPORARY PROCE-
DURES AND ADMINISTRATION 
REGULATIONS UNDER THE TAX 
EQUITY AND FISCAL RESPONSIBIL-
ITY ACT OF 1982 (PUB. L 97-248) 
§ 401 6325-1 Release of hens 
(a) In general The district director 
shall issue a certificate of release for a 
filed notice of Federal tax lien not 
later than 30 days after the date on 
which the district director finds that 
the entire tax liability listed in such 
notice of Federal tax lien has been 
fully satisfied (as defined in paragraph 
(c) of this section) or has become le 
gaily unenforceable 
(b) Certificate of release for a lien 
which has become legally unenforce 
able The district director shall have 
the authority to file a notice of Feder 
al tax lien which also contains a certif 
icate of release pertaining to those 
liens which become legally unenforce 
able. Such release will become effec 
tive as a release as of a date prescribed 
in the document containing the notice 
of Federal tax lien and certificate of 
release. 
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CITRUS STATE BANK, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
William J. McKENDRICK, Defendant 
and Respondent 
Civ. No. B040211. 
Court of Appeal, Second District, 
Division 3. 
Nov. 16, 1989. 
Following purchase at foreclosure sale 
of more senior deed of trust, bank sought 
deficiency. The Superior Court, Los Ange-
les County, Gregory C. O'Brien, Jr., J., 
dismissed, and bank appealed. The Court 
of Appeal, Croskey, J., held that three-
month period of limitations applicable to 
deficiency actions applies to a junior trust 
deed holder who has purchased the secured 
property at the foreclosure sale of senior 
trust deed. 
Affirmed. 
1. Mortgages «=»375 
Three-month limitation period for defi-
ciency actions following mortgage fore-
closure applies to bar an action for a defi-
ciency judgment brought beyond that peri-
od by a junior trust deed holder who has 
purchased the secured property at a fore-
closure sale of a more senior trust deed. 
West's Ann.Cal.C.C.P. § 580a. 
2. Mortgages «=»378 
Foreclosure sale under deed of trust 
cut off security interests of all Benholders 
junior to the foreclosed trust deed. 
3. Mortgages «=»375 
Three-month limitation period for defi-
ciency judgment following foreclosure of 
deed of trust or mortgage does not apply to 
a nonpurchasing junior trust deed holder. 
West's Ann.Cal.C.C.P. § 580a. 
4. Mortgages <fc*375 
Statute dealing with deficiency judg-
ment after foreclosure of deed of trust or 
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mortgage provides the exclusive remedy if 
junior lienholder who purchases secured 
property at senior foreclosure sale desires 
to recover deficiency judgment following 
nonjudicial foreclosure. 
5. Mortgages <3=»375 
Statute which prohibits deficiency 
judgment following nonjudicial foreclosure 
of deed of trust or mortgage will not be 
applied to bar deficiency judgment to junior 
lienor purchasing at senior's sale. West's 
Ann.GaLC.C.P. § 580d. 
McAlpin, Doonan & Seese, Daniel J. Doo-
nan, Corina, for plaintiff and appellant 
Patrick L. Barnes, Arcadia, for defen-
dant and respondent 
CROSKEY, Associate Justice. 
[1] This case raises the novel question 
of whether the three month period of limi-
tation, set out in Code of Civil Procedure 
section 580a \ applies to bar an action for a 
deficiency judgment brought beyond that 
period by a junior trust deed holder who 
has purchased the secured property at a 
foreclosure sale of a more senior trust 
deed. We hold that it does. 
Plaintiff Citrus State Bank ("Bank") ap-
peals from a judgment following a nonsuit 
on its complaint to recover such a deficien-
cy judgment against the defendant William 
J. McKendrick ("McKendrick"). Because 
we conclude that the Bank, as a junior 
lienholder who purchased the secured real 
property at a senior foreclosure, (1) is 
bound by section 580a and (2) failed to 
bring its action within the required three 
month period, we affirm the judgment 
1. Unless otherwise indicated all code references 
are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 
2. Although it is not entirely clear from the 
record, it appears that the Bank bid enough to 
pay off the encumbrance of the foreclosing 
third trust deed holder, plus interest, costs and 
trustee fees, and simply took title to the secured 
property subject to all remaining senior encum-
brances. Of course, such foreclosure sale cut 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL 
BACKGROUND 
On September 29, 1983, the Bank made a 
loan to McKendrick in the sum of $38,445. 
Repayment of the loan was secured by a 
deed of trust executed by McKendrick on a 
parcel of residential real property located 
in Temple City, California. This deed of 
trust was subordinate to four senior trust 
deeds, three judgment liens and one Em-
ployment Development Department lien in 
favor of the State of California. The total 
of these senior encumbrances was approxi-
mately $154,000. 
[2] On February 28, 1984, the holder of 
the third trust deed recorded a notice of 
default under her deed of trust and a trust-
ee's (non-judicial) foreclosure sale was set 
for June 20, 1984. On that date, the Bank, 
in order to protect its own subordinate 
claim, was the successful bidder at the 
sale. At that time the total combined debts 
against the property were $192,386.38 (in-
cluding the amount owed to the Bank of 
$38,445, plus interest at 13.5% for a total of 
$41,369.98.) The Bank purchased the prop-
erty for the total sum of $45,132 and re-
ceived a trustee's deed which was dated 
June 20, 1984 and ultimately recorded on 
December 7,1984.2 The property was later 
resold by the Bank on May 29, 1985, for 
$146,500. The Bank claims that this was 
an open market sale and the price received 
represented the then fair market value of 
the property.3 
On August 8, 1985, over 14 months after 
the date of the foreclosure sale, the Bank 
filed this action against McKendrick seek-
ing a deficiency judgment for the full 
amount of the unpaid note, plus interest 
The case went to trial on November 15, 
1988 and McKendrick made a motion for a 
nonsuit on the ground that the action had 
not been filed in a timely manner. McKen-
off the security interests of all henholders junior 
to the foreclosed third trust deed. 
3. However, we note that the record reflects that 
the Bank's own appraisal of the property in July 
of 1983 (made when it approved McKendrick's 
loan application) reflected a valuation of $167,-
000. 
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drick argued that the Bank was seeking a 
deficiency judgment after a non-judicial 
foreclosure sale and was therefore re-
quired, under the provisions of section 
580a, to file the action within three months 
of the date of the sale. The trial court 
agreed and granted the motion. The 
Bank's subsequent motion for reconsidera-
tion was denied. After entry of a judg-
ment based on the nonsuit order, the Bank 
filed a timely appeal. 
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES 
[3] As already noted, the central issue 
presented here is whether the three month 
limitation period in section 580a applies to a 
junior trust deed holder who purchases the 
secured property at the foreclosure of a 
more senior trust deed.4 Obviously, if it 
does then the trial court's ruling was cor-
rect However, the Bank argues that it 
should be treated no differently than a 
sold-out junior who does not purchase the 
property and that therefore the applicable 
limitations period should be four years, as 
provided in section 337. McKendrick, on 
the other hand, contends that the fact that 
the Bank was the purchaser makes a crit-
ical difference and that all of the provisions 
of section 580a, including the three month 
limitations period, are applicable and the 
Bank's action was therefore untimely. 
4. As we explain below, it clearly does not apply 
to a non-purchasing junior trust deed holder. 
Such a "sold-out" junior is not bound by the 
limitations of section 580a and may sue for the 
full amount of the unpaid obligation without 
regard to those limitations. 
5. Section 580a as it read at times relevant to this 
matter, provided: 
"Whenever a money judgment is sought for 
the balance due upon an obligation for the pay-
ment of which a deed of trust or mortgage with 
power of sale upon real property or any interest 
therein was given as security, following the ex-
ercise of the power of sale in such deed of trust 
or mortgage, the plaintiff shall set forth in his 
complaint the entire amount of the indebted-
ness which was secured by said deed of trust or 
mortgage at the time of sale, the amount for 
which such real property or interest therein was 
sold and the fair market value thereof at the 
date of sale and the date of such sale. Upon the 
application of either party made at least 10 days 
before the time of trial the court shall, and upon 
its own motion the court at any time may. 
DISCUSSION 
"In the absence of a statute to the con-
trary, a creditor secured by a trust deed or 
mortgage on real property may recover the 
full amount of the debt upon default. He 
may realize the security or sue on the 
obligation or both; the obligation is an 
independent undertaking by the debtor to 
pay. [Citation.] In most states now, how-
ever, the creditor's right to enforce such a 
debt is restricted by statute. Thus, in Cali-
fornia the creditor must rely upon his se-
curity before enforcing the debt (Code 
Civ.Proc., §§ 580a, 725a, 726.) If the se-
curity is insufficient, his right to a judg-
ment against the debtor for the deficiency 
may be limited or barred by sections 580a, 
580b, 580d, or 726 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure. 
"Under sections 580a and 726, proceed-
ings for a deficiency must be initiated with-
in three months after either a private sale 
under a power of sale or a judicial sale, and 
the recovery may not exceed the difference 
between the amount of the indebtedness 
and the fair market value of the property 
at the time of the sale." (Roseleaf Corp. v. 
Chierigkino (1963) 59 Cal.2d 35, 38-39, 27 
CaLRptr. 873, 378 P.2d 97, fn. omitted.) 
Section 580a5 was enacted in 1933 and 
provides that the amount of a deficiency 
appoint one of the probate tax referees provided 
for by law to appraise the property or the inter-
est therein sold as of the time of sale. Such 
referee shall file his appraisal with the clerk and 
the same shall be admissible in evidence. Such 
referee shall take and subscribe an oath to be 
attached to the appraisal that he has truly, hon-
estly and impartially appraised the property to 
the best of his knowledge and ability. Any 
referee so appointed may be called and exam-
ined as a witness by any party or by the court 
itself. The court must fix the compensation of 
such referee in an amount as determined by the 
court to be reasonable, but such fees shall not 
exceed similar fees for similar services in the 
community where such services are rendered, 
which may be taxed and allowed tn like manner 
as other costs. Before rendering any judgment 
the court shall find the fair market value of the 
real property, or interest therein sold, at the 
time of sale. The court may render judgment 
for not more than the amount by which the 
entire amount of the indebtedness due at the 
time of sale exceeded the fair market value of 
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judgment after a non-judicial foreclosure 
sale of secured real property shall be "the 
lesser of 1) the excess of the indebtedness 
over the fair market value of the property 
or 2) the excess of the indebtedness over 
the sale price. Enacted at a time when the 
Depression had depleted cash and credit 
[citation], the statute was 'designed to pre-
vent creditors from buying in at their own 
sales at deflated prices and realizing double 
recoveries by holding debtors for large de-
ficiencies.' (Walter E. Heller Western, 
Inc. v. Bloxham (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 266, 
270-271, 221 CaLRptr. 425, quoting from 
Roseleaf Corp. v. Ckierigkino, supra, 59 
Cal.2d 35, 40, 27 Cal.Rptr. 873, 378 P.2d 
97.) The section also provided at the time 
of the subject foreclosure, that "Any such 
action must be brought within three 
months of the time of sale under such deed 
of trust or mortgage." € 
While this section, as well as related 
anti-deficiency provisions, is fairly easy to 
apply in the context of a single lienholder, 
difficulties arise when there are multiple 
encumbrances and a foreclosure sale by 
one leaves others with their previously se-
cured obligations unpaid. For example, 
what are the rights of a junior trust deed 
holder whose interest is foreclosed, along 
with the debtor's, by the non-judicial sale 
of the secured property under a more sen-
ior Ken? 
This issue was addressed by the Supreme 
Court in Roseleaf Corp. v. Ckierigkino, 
supra, 59 Cal.2d 35, 27 CaLRptr. 873, 378 
P.2d 97, where it was held that the limita-
thc real property or interest therein sold at the 
time of sale with interest thereon from the date 
of the sale; provided, however, that in no event 
shall the amount of said judgment, exclusive of 
interest after the date of sale, exceed the differ-
ence between the amount for which the proper-
ty was sold and the entire amount of the indebt-
edness secured by said deed of trust or mort-
gage. Any such action must be brought within 
three months of the time of sale under such deed 
of trust or mortgage. No judgment shall be 
rendered in any such action until the real prop-
erty or interest therein has first been sold pursu-
ant to the terms of such deed of trust or mort-
gage, unless such real property or interest there-
in has become valueless.** (Emphasis added.) 
6. Effective July 1, 1989, this penultimate sen-
tence in section 580a was changed to read: "Any 
tions of section 580a did not extend to "sold 
out" junior lienholders. The court ex-
plained that, "The position of a junior lien-
or whose security is lost through a senior 
sale is different from that of a selling 
senior lienor. A selling senior can make 
certain that the security brings an amount 
equal to his claim against the debtor or the 
fair market value, whichever is less, simply 
by bidding in for that amount. He need 
not invest any additional funds. The junior 
lienor, however, is in no better position to 
protect himself than is the debtor. Either 
would have to invest additional funds to 
redeem or buy in at the sale. Equitable 
considerations favor placing this burden on 
the debtor, not only because it is his de-
fault that provokes the senior sale, but also 
because he has the benefit of his bargain 
with the junior lienor who, unlike the sell-
ing senior, might otherwise end up with 
nothing." (IcL, at p. 41, 27 CaLRptr. 873, 
378 P.2d 97.) 
Thus, a sold-out junior lienholder whose 
interest is lost by virtue of a senior fore-
closure is free to sue directly on his unpaid 
(and now unsecured) note and is not encum-
bered by the provisions of section 580a. 
That is, the amount of the deficiency is not 
limited, there is no need to obtain a fair 
market appraisal of the secured property 
and it is not necessary that the action be 
commenced within three months of the 
foreclosure sale. The applicable limitations 
period is four years as provided in section 
337.7 However, this rule does not apply 
where the junior lienholder is the purchaser 
such action must be brought within three 
months of the time of sale under the deed of 
trust or mortgage." (New language under-
lined.) 
7. Section 337 provides for a four year limita-
tions for "An action upon any contract, obli-
gation or liability founded upon an instrument 
in writing, except as provided in Section 336a of 
this code; provided, that the time within which 
any action for a money judgment for the bal-
ance due upon an obligation for the payment of 
which a deed of trust or mortgage with power 
of sale upon real property or any interest there-
in was given as security, following the exercise 
of the power of sale in such deed of trust or 
mortgage, may be brought shall not extend be-
yond three months after the time of sale under 
such deed of trust or mortgage.'' 
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of the secured property at the senior fore-
closure. 
The first California case involving a pur-
chasing junior lienholder was Walter E. 
Heller Western Inc. v. Bloxham, supra, 
176 Cal.App.3d 266, 221 Cal.Rptr. 425. Al-
though the case involved the "fair value" 
provisions of section 580a, it is directly 
applicable here. The plaintiff, Heller, was 
the holder of a subordinated deed of trust 
and purchased the secured property at the 
senior's non-judicial foreclosure sale. Fol-
lowing the sale, Heller filed an action on its 
note which had been wiped out by the 
foreclosure sale and sought a deficiency for 
the full amount due. The foreclosure sale 
did not result in any significant money to 
be applied to the subordinated note. In 
fact, Heller's bid was ohly $2.00 over the 
amount of the senior lien. As that case 
clearly illustrates, there is a real distinction 
between a junior lienor who purchases the 
secured property at a senior sale and a 
junior who is "sold-out". 
This is a distinction that was not present-
ed in Roseleaf. 'The junior in Roseleaf did 
not purchase at the senior's sale. To apply 
the fair value limitations to that junior 
would result in the amount of his deficien-
cy being limited by the amount of someone 
else's bid, a factor over which he has no 
control. However, once a junior chooses to 
purchase, it is equitable to apply the fan-
value limitations to him. Any loss to him 
as creditor by his own underbidding is 
gained by him as purchaser for a bargain 
«. Hillen v. Soulc (1935) 7 Cal.App.2d 45, 45 P.2d 
349, disapproved on another point in Brown v. 
Jensen (1953) 41 Cal.2d 193, 198-199, 259 ?2& 
425. 
9. However, the court in Bank of Hemet did note 
that the plaintiff bank, a purchasing junior lien-
holder, had failed to file a deficiency action on 
its unpaid indebtedness within the required 
three months, thereby losing the right to seek a 
deficiency judgment against its debtor. The 
court nonetheless determined to apply the fair 
value provisions of section 580a even though an 
action for a deficiency judgment was no longer 
available to the bank. As the ultimate question 
in the case involved the amount of the redemp-
tion price to be paid by the United States, under 
28 United States Code section 2410(d) (in order 
to protect its tax lien which was junior to the 
bank's encumbrance), the court had to decide 
how much of the bank's debt had been satisfied 
price. [Citation.] To so limit the deficien-
cy judgment right is consistent with the 
general purpose of section 580a, viz., to 
protect against a lienor buying in the prop-
erty at a deflated price, obtaining a defi-
ciency judgment, and achieving a recovery 
in excess of the debt by reselling the prop-
erty at a profit [f] The unmis-
takable policy of California is to prevent 
excess recoveries by secured creditors., 
Bank of Hemet v. United States (9th Cir. 
1981) 643 F.2d 661, 669." (Walter E. Hel-
ler Western, Inc. v. Bloxham, supra, 176 
Cal.App.3d at pp. 273-274, 221 CaLRptr. 
425; see also, Bank of Hemet v. United 
States (9th Cir.1981) 643 F.2d 661.) 
The Bank's argument to this court relies 
heavily upon the decision in Roseleaf and 
an earlier California case8 which also de-
clined to apply section 580a to a junior 
lienor's efforts to secure a deficiency judg-
ment Both cases, however, are distin-
guishable as neither involved a purchasing 
junior lienholder. 
Nonetheless, the Bank takes the view 
that the rule of Roseleaf should apply irre-
spective of whether the junior was a pur-
chaser or was simply "sold out" It some-
what cavalierly dismisses Heller as bad law 
and Bank of Hemet v. United States, su-
pra, 643 F.2d 661, as a federal case entitled 
to little weight 
The Bank emphasizes that neither case 
involved or discussed the question of the 
three month limitations period9 and argues 
that they stand only for the proposition 
by reason of the bank's purchase at the senior 
foreclosure. 
The court held the fact that the bank had 
purchased the secured property was dispositive 
and required the application of section 580a. 
The court concluded, "We reject treating the 
entire debt of the Bank as an obligation 'satis-
fied by reason of such sale.' To the extent, if 
any, the Bank's debt was eliminated by its fail-
ure to seek a deficiency judgment pursuant to 
section 580a it is not possible to say that that 
portion was 'satisfied by reason of such sale.' 
Its destruction came about because of events 
subsequent to the sale. Thus, we conclude that, 
by reason of the application of section 580a to 
the Bank's purchase at the foreclosure sale of 
the first lienholder's security interest, the 
amount of the Bank's debt 'satisfied by reason 
of such sale' is the amount by which the fair 
market value of the property at the time of the 
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that the "fair value" provisions of section 
680a apply to a purchasing junior. The 
Bank urges that neither case can be read to 
require that the three month limitations 
period also be applied. The Bank claims 
that unless the four year period in section 
337 is the applicable period of limitations 
the Bank will be deprived of substantial 
rights because, until a resale of the proper-
ty takes place (a process which here took 
over a year), the amount of the deficiency 
can not be determined. Finally, the bank 
argues that the references in both sections 
580a and 337 to an action brought within 
three months after a "sale under such deed 
of trust" (emphasfe added) means that the 
limitation is imposed only on the Jiolder of 
the deed of trust under which the fore-
closure sale is being conducted. 
[4,51 We reject all of these arguments. 
Heller and Bank of Hemet are well rea-
soned decisions and reached results that 
are both fair and consistent with Califor-
nia's strong public policy to prevent exces-
sive recoveries by secured creditors. like 
the court in Heller, we conclude that a 
junior lienholder who purchases the se-
cured property at a senior foreclosure sale 
is bound by section 580a. It provides the 
exclusive remedy if such junior desires to 
recover a deficiency judgment following a 
non-judicial foreclosure.1* 
In addition, we see no reason to apply 
only a portion of section 580a. As noted, 
both Heller and bank of Hemet involved 
sale exceeded the amount paid by the Bank for 
the property at the time of the sale. This is the 
'(A) portion' of the section 2410(d) redemption 
price while the amount paid by the Bank for the 
property of the sale is the '(B) portion.'" {Bank 
of Hemet v. United States, supra, 643 F.2d at p. 
670.) 
10. SecUon 580d notwithstanding, a deficiency 
judgment is permitted in these circumstances. 
As the court held in Walter E Heller Western 
Inc. v. Bloxham, supra, 176 Cal.App.3d at p. 273, 
221 CaLRptr. 425. section 580d (which prohibits 
a deficiency judgment following a non-judicial 
foreclosure) will not be applied to bar a defi-
ciency judgment to a junior lienor purchasing at 
a senior's sale. "(T]he purpose of [section 580d] 
is to create a parity of remedies available to the 
foreclosing beneficiary: judicial sale with the 
right to a deficiency judgment accompanied by 
the debtor's right of redemption, or private sale 
resulting in nonredeemable title with no right to 
a deficiency. [Citation.] Although the purchas-
the application of that section's "fair val-
ue" limitations. No issue was raised in 
either case as to the three month limita-
tions period provided for in the penultimate 
sentence of the section. However, the lan-
guage of section 580a could not be clearer. 
It states that any action for a deficiency 
judgment "must be brought within three 
months" of the foreclosure sale. Given the 
mandate of section 580a, an action brought 
more than three months after the sale, as 
is the case here, is subject to dismissal as 
untimely. 
Nor does this result in any injustice to 
the purchasing junior. There is no need 
for him to await a subsequent resale on the 
open market. The "fair value" provisions 
of section 580a provide for a specific pro-
cess of evaluation which is to take place 
after the complaint is filed and is an inte-
gral part of formal pre-trial preparation. 
It is that valuation, rather than any actual 
subsequent sale, which will control the cal-
culation of the claimed deficiency. Even if 
an open market sale were to occur prior to 
trial it would only be persuasive, not con-
trolling, on such "fair value" determina-
tion. 
Finally, we reject the Bank's contention 
that section 580a is limited by its terms to 
the foreclosing senior. In the context of a 
purchasing junior, there is no reason to 
make the distinction urged by the Bank.11 
A junior lienholder effectively steps into 
the shoes of the senior when he purchases 
ing junior ends up with nonredeemable title, he 
is not the one who elected the private sale and 
had no opportunity to evaluate the desirability 
of that remedy in light of his situation. It 
would be unfair to eliminate the purchasing 
junior's right to a deficiency based on a choice 
made by the senior lienholder." (Id., at p. 273, 
221 CaLRptr. 425.) 
11. Indeed, section 580a, prior to its recent 
amendment, used the phrase "such deed of 
trust" not only in connection with the three 
month limitations period, but also with respect 
to the "fair value" provisions which the Bank 
concedes apply to limit its deficiency claim. 
The Bank offers no explanation as to why we 
should conclude that such language restricts 
application of the three months limitation peri-
od to the foreclosing senior, but at the same 
time permits the fair value limitation to be 
applied to both the senior and the purchasing 
junior. 
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the secured property at the senior's fore-
closure. Unlike the sold-out junior the se-
curity for the payment of his debt has not 
been rendered valueless, but rather he is 
protected by the difference between the 
fair value of the property and the amount 
of the foreclosure sale price. Upon comple-
tion of the senior foreclosure sale he ac-
quires an unredeemable title which he is 
free to resell.12 To the extent that the fair 
market value exceeds the amount of the 
senior liens whicji were not discharged by 
the foreclosure sale, the indebtedness due 
the junior has been satisfied and failure to 
apply section 580a could result in a double 
recovery. 
We thereforte conclude that the trial 
court was correct in granting a nonsuit 
The Bank's delay for over fourteen months 
went well beyond the time mandated by 
section 580a. 
DISPOSITION 
The judgment is affirmed. McKendrick 
shall recover his costs on appeal. 
KLEIN, PJ., and ARABIAN, J., 
concur. 
BRYAN W. CANNON 
BEESLEY & FAIRCLOUGH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4 0 East South Temple, #3 00 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-2100 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ASSOCIATES FINANCIAL SERVICES 
a Corporation| 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FRANKLIN L. SLAUGH and 
CHERYL D. SLAUGH, 
Defendants. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 890906166 
JUDGE UNO 
rJ-ST7-ciO-(&ncuwv 
This matter came on regularly for oral argument before 
the above entitled Court on June 22, 1990 before the Honorable 
Raymond S. Uno. The Court, having entered its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, hereby 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that plaintiff is hereby 
granted judgment against defendants as follows: 
1. For Judgment in the principal sum of $26,087.71, 
together with interest in the pum of $3,848.13. 
2. For a reasonable attorney's fee in the sum of 
$3,000.00. 
The total Judgment of $32,935.84 shall bear interest at 
the rate of 18% until paid in full.^ _ , 
DATED this ,Q5~ day of iEwre/ 1990. 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
BRYAN W. CANNON, #0561 
BEESLEY & FAIRCLOUGH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4 0 East South Temple, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-2100 
JUL 25 1S90 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ASSOCIATES FINANCIAL SERVICES 
a Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
FRANKLIN L. SLAUGH and 
CHERYL D. SLAUGH, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 890906166 
JUDGE UNO 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for oral 
argument on the 22nd day of June, 1990, before the Honorable 
Raymond S. Uno at the hour of 9:00 A.M. Bryan W. Cannon appeared 
for the plaintiff, and Franklin L. Slaugh appeared pro se and as 
attorney for Cheryl D. Slaugh. Based upon the stipulations of fact 
and oral arguments of counsel, the Court hereby enters its Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendants, Franklin and Cheryl Slaugh (Slaughs), 
entered into a loan agreement with plaintiff, Associates Financial 
1 
Services (Associates), on or about November 26, 1982. 
2. The loan agreement included a note in the amount of 
$3 3,104.14, plus interest accruing as shown in the Note. 
3. The note was secured by a trust deed on real 
property located at 8620 South Gladiator Way, Sandy, Utah. 
4. The lien of Associates was a second mortgage on the 
property. 
5. The senior lien was in favor of Utah Mortgage Loan 
Corporation (Utah Mortgage). 
6. Prior to February of 1989, Slaughs went into default 
on the Utah Mortgage trust deed but did not go into default on the 
Associates trust deed. 
7. Because of Slaughs1 default, Utah Mortgage commenced 
a non-judicial foreclosure and eventually conducted a trustee's 
sale on the real property. 
8. The trustee's sale occurred on February 28, 1989. 
Associates appeared at the sale and bid an amount of $26,000.00 as 
the high bid. The amount owing to Utah Mortgage was approximately 
$20,000.00 at the time of the sale. 
9. The value of the real property at the time of sale 
was more than $40,000.00, although the exact market value has not 
been established. 
2 
10. At the time of the foreclosure sale there were 
unreleased federal tax liens against Slaughs which were also liens 
on the real estate. 
11. The branch manager of Associates, who attended the 
sale, did not actually know about the federal tax liens, although 
they were of record. 
12. |Associates1 file on Slaughs was in Dallas, Texas at 
the time of the sale. The file did have a copy of a title report 
that identified the federal tax liens. 
13. Under federal law, the IRS has a 120-day right of 
redemption on any trustee's sale when a lien is in place. As a 
result of the 120 day right of redemption, the IRS paid Associates 
the sum of $2 6,000.00 within 12 0-days of the sale to cover the high 
bid at sale. 
14. The IRS took title to the real property under the 
redemption and wiped out any interest of Associates in the 
property. The net proceeds of the redemption to Associates was 
approximately $5,700.00, which amount was applied to the account 
of Slaughs to reduce the balance owing. 
15. The balance of the Note and Trust Deed, after 
redemption, was the sum of $26,089.71, together with interest from 
September 1989 pursuant to the terms of the note. 
3 
16. No payments have been made by Slaughs to Associates 
since the redemption by the IRS. 
17. The Note provides for an award of attorney's fees 
in the event it is necessary to enforce collection of the Note. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Associates, as a junior lien purchaser at the sale 
of a senior trust deed is not bound by the Section 57-1-32, Utah 
Code Annotated, 3-month right of action rule when the IRS exercises 
4 
a 12 0-day right of redemption. 
2. Section 78-37-1, Utah Code Annotated ("One-Action-
Rule") did not require Associates to first conduct a non-judicial 
foreclosure before bringing its action for the balance of its debt, 
since the security was lost, not through the fault of Associates, 
but because of failures by Slaughs. 
3. Plaintiff, Associates, is entitled to a Judgment 
against Slaughs in the sum of $26,089.71, together with interest 
from and after September of 1989 pursuant to the terms of the Note 
and for a reasonable attorney's fee for prosecution of this action. 
DATED this 2L<± day of July, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
Y^A_^^^ ^ ^ yCt^-r-
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
4 
